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On January 12th, 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council expressed its support for the 
transition of the African Union operation AM IS in Darfur into a UN operation. On February 3rd, 
such a transition was endorsed by the Security Council for the first time.1 On August 31st, 2006, 
the Security Council decided to expand the mandate of UNMIS to support implementation of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement and the N'djamena Agreement on Humanitarian Cease-fire on the Conflict 
in Darfur. The consent of the Government of Sudan for the deployment of a multidimensional 
United Nations peace operation in Darfur was invited;2 the Government, however, never gave its 
consent. Subsequently, a high-level consultation in Addis Ababa on November 16th, 2006, outlined 
a three-phased approach for the United Nations' support to AMIS. First, a light support package was 
to be provided, followed by a heavy support package, after which finally the operation would be 
turned into  an African Union-United Nations hybrid operation. On December 23rd, President 
Omer AI-Bashir reaffirmed his government's readiness to implement these Addis Ababa 
conclusions. Since then, however, the conflict in Darfur continued and AMIS came under attack 
several times within the first half of 2007. The implementation of the Addis Ababa conclusions 
ground to a halt with only the partial deployment of the light support package. Nonetheless, on 5 
June 2007, the Secretary-General produced a report which contained the proposal for the 
deployment of the hybrid operation.3 
 
Scenarios 
The proposed hybrid operation is only one of the possible scenarios the African Union, the United 
Nations Secretariat, and the Security Council could potentially have chosen. If one decides to 
intervene in conflicts, one should, in principal, first analyze the problem so that the best solution can 
be selected. In other words, the scope of the problem should determine the solution as well as the 
interveners and their mandate. Having said this, there were only a number of possible scenarios for 
international involvement in the conflict in Darfur and the deployment of an enlarged peace 
operation: 
 
a) AMIS in Darfur could have remained the same, with a possible early start of a peace process on 
lower levels; 
b) AMIS in Darfur could have been reinforced and strengthened; 
c) UNMIS could have been extended into Darfur, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1706 
(2006); 
d) A hybrid operation in Darfur of AMIS combined with so-called United Nations Light and 
Heavy Support Packages could have been deployed; 
e) A regional operation, a multi-dimensional United Nations presence, in the border regions in 
Chad and the Central African Republic, as foreseen in Security Council presidential statement 55 
(2006), could have been established;  
f) A humanitarian intervention in Darfur (either unilateral, coalition of the willing, EU or NATO) 
could have been undertaken. 
  
Some of these scenarios were more likely than others - and those which were likely were not all 
potentially as effective. Although presently, the scenario of the hybrid operation has received the 
most international attention, it is likely that in the end a combination will result. This article reviews 
which factors determine the likelihood of certain scenarios becoming reality, and consequently 
which factors led the Security Council thus far to opt for the hybrid operation. Broadly speaking, 
there are six such factors which are discussed below. 
Factors determining the likelihood of possible scenarios 
 
Support of the local parties 
Although the support of local parties is not a necessity for the deployment of a peace operation, it 
may be helpful. If conflicting parties do not want international involvement and perhaps choose to 
forcefully oppose it, the intervention requires a different mandate. Not every organization is able to 
perform each sort of operation. Pure peacekeeping with the consent of the parties can be per-
formed by all organizations mentioned in the above scenarios. In case of enforcement actions, the 
AU would be the least likely organization to undertake them. The EU has, up until now, never really 
been involved in enforcement actions. The United Nations is acquiring these skills, but thus far 
enforcement operations are largely within the field of either a coalition of the willing or NATO. In 
the case of Darfur, the Government of Sudan has made it clear it will resist anything else but the 
present AU mission or a hybrid operation. In other words, any other sort of operation or any 
involvement of other organizations will be challenged by the government or its proxies and therefore 
requires peace enforcement capabilities - unless the government is pressured to change its mind. 
 
Support of the Security Council  
In principal peace operations need to be mandated by the UN Security Council. Consequently, in 
order to be carried out, a scenario needs to obtain the support of at least nine of the fifteen members 
of the Council. Moreover, the permanent members of the Council need to support the decision or at 
least abstain in voting. If one of them vetoes a draft resolution, it will not come into effect. Although 
theoretically, humanitarian intervention without the approval of the Security Council is possible, it 
is very uncommon. 
In the case of Sudan, China has shown through its voting pattern in the Council that although it 
supports the deployment of the United Nations in Darfur, it only supports such a decision "with the 
consent of the Government of National Unity". Another permanent member, the Russian 
Federation, does not support an activist policy by the Council either, as in the case of Qatar;4 both 
China and Qatar have large oil interests in Sudan. Russia not only opposes intervention in Darfur 
because of fears concerning the consequences such an activist policy might have on international 
involvement in its own conflict in Chechnya, but also because of economic reasons i.e. maintaining 
good relations with the present government in light of its large defense and oil interests.5 In other 
words, unless Khartoum approves it, it is very unlikely that the Security Council will decide to 
deploy a peace enforcement operation. 
 
Over-deployment/overstretch  
Presently, armed forces of Western countries such as the United States, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands, are deployed in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Their great numbers in those areas 
do not allow these countries to send a lot of forces into Africa. The armed forces of these Western 
states appear to be close to overstretching and overdeployment, and have few spare forces to send to 
an operation like Sudan.6 
As a result, even if Western governments wanted to send their forces to Darfur, and especially if 
these forces were to be involved in peace enforcement actions for which large numbers are 
necessary, they do not have these forces at their disposal. A large-scale Western military 
intervention in Darfur is only possible once their forces no longer need to be committed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Currently, the best Western governments can do is send such specialized forces like 
Special Forces, engineering, etc.7 
 
Perception/fear of danger for intervening force  
In many Western countries, the experiences of Rwanda and Somalia in the mid-1990s have caused 
governments to become cautious on the subject of deploying forces in Africa. A widespread 
perception exists that Africa is a continent torn apart by ancient tribal conflicts, which are highly 
irrational and wherein the parties may easily turn against peacekeepers. As governments fear body 
bags, Kofï Annan's expression, "peace-keeping is like giving first aid to a wounded rattlesnake," is 
often blown up to the rule that African conflicts are not to be meddled in.8 This belief is further 
strengthened by the general lack of Western interest in the continent. France is a notable exception, 
as it is very much involved in 'la Francophonie', in Africa and also militarily. It is not likely that 
Western troops, or a NATO or EU operation for that matter, will send large numbers to enforce 
peace in Darfur. This region in Sudan does not represent sufficient Western interests, and the public 
outrage over the conflict is not large enough.  The  pro intervention lobby  is stronger in the United 
States than in Europe, but has thus far not been able to gain a strong foothold even there. This 
situation is not likely to change, unless a stronger connection between the government in Khartoum 
and terrorism appears. In that case, the United States might be triggered to actively seek regime 
change; however, up to this moment this has not been the case (see below). Until now, the mantra, 
"African solutions to African problems," has become an easy excuse for Western powers to wash 
their hands of active policies in Darfur.9 
 
Perception/ fear of escalation  
In the case of Sudan, the fear of African conflicts is exacerbated by the fact that the government of 
Sudan might oppose a Western intervention or even a Western presence in Darfur forcefully, and 
that another war like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan might result. During the 1990s, Sudan 
harbored 'terrorists' such as Osama bin-Laden. In the aftermath of 9-11, Khartoum has chosen to be 
more 'with' than 'against' the US government. If the West sought confrontation, radicals in 
Khartoum might project such Western forces in Darfur as a 'crusaders' plot' and reverse the balance 
again. These fears are further aggravated by the demonstrations following Security Council 
resolution 1556. Islamic radicalism seems to be just around the corner.10 The last thing Western 
governments need is a further escalation of the already far too intense conflict in Darfur. 
 
Donor fatigue 
Operations deployed by the African Union are generally not very intrusive as a result of a rather 
strong commitment by the organization to the principle of non-interference. In addition, they are 
generally less capable as a result of a chronic lack of capacity. UN Peacekeeping operations are 
paid for by the assessed contributions to the United Nations. Consequently, the United Nations has 
no budgetary problems as its funds are guaranteed. This is not the case with regional organizations 
such as the African Union. These organizations have to search for donor assistance when they 
deploy a peacekeeping force, as their member states are less able to contribute generously. 
However, nowadays Western donors appear to react less enthusiastically when confronted with 
another bill for another peace operation in yet another conflict in Africa.11 As a result, AU 
operations are generally underfunded, deployed late, difficult to expand, and often replaced by UN 
operations if possible. 
In the case of Sudan, this has resulted in problems funding AMIS. Consequently, the AU operation 
in Darfur has had a persistent lack of basic resources and has consequently been unable to operate 
effectively and efficiently. Although AMIS II has been much more robust, better resourced and 
equipped with better logistics than the 60 unarmed military observers of AMIS I, the operation still 
lacks important resources.12 Even the Sudanese government calls upon donors to aid, but funds 
have not been pouring in.13 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The above factors determined the likelihood of possible scenarios translating to reality, and 
consequently explain what led the international community at present to opt for the hybrid 
operation. What results from this analysis is the conclusion that nothing with-holds the United 
Nations from deploying a regional operation - a multi-dimensional UN presence - in the border 
regions in Chad and the Central African Republic. An early start of a peace process at lower levels 
can also still be stimulated. With regard to the force in Darfur itself, however, the international 
community concluded that only a more robust peace operation would contribute to a better situation 
in Darfur. Consequently, keeping AMIS the way it was would not help. At the same time, peace 
enforcement actions were not likely. The absence of the consent of the government in Khartoum to 
the deployment of such a UN operation made that scenario a remote possibility - it would most 
likely be vetoed within the Security Council. A humanitarian intervention without the consent of the 
Council was and still is also far from likely. Not only did the organizations (i.e. NATO and the EU) 
and countries (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands) which were - and still 
are -most capable to undertake such actions lack the forces, but they also feared the dangers of 
Africa and escalation. Although it was probably far from the best solution, the further 
implementation of the plan for a hybrid operation in Darfur stemming from the Addis Ababa 
conclusions seemed and probably still is the only realistic possibility for the time being. Such a 
hybrid operation, however, still leaves a spectrum of possibilities. On the side, a relatively weak 
operation like AMIS becomes stronger the more it is strengthened with UN packages, until it is 
more or less a UN operation on the other side of the spectrum. Nonetheless, only if the situation 
changes in regard to the factors discussed in this article, will it be likely that a different sort of 
operation other than the hybrid operation is sent to Darfur.  
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